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“Emerging” infectious diseases can be defined as infections that have newly
appeared in a population or have existed but are rapidly increasing in incidence or
geographic range. Among recent examples are HIV/AIDS, hantavirus pulmonary
syndrome, Lyme disease, and hemolytic uremic syndrome (a foodborne infection
caused by certain strains of Escherichia coli). Specific factors precipitating disease
emergence can be identified in virtually all cases. These include ecological, environ-
mental, or demographic factors that place people at increased contact with a pre-
viously unfamiliar microbe or its natural host or promote dissemination. These
factors are increasing in prevalence; this increase, together with the ongoing evolution
of viral and microbial variants and selection for drug resistance, suggests that
infections will continue to emerge and probably increase and emphasizes the urgent
need for effective surveillance and control. Dr. David Satcher’s article and this
overview inaugurate “Perspectives,” a regular section in this journal intended to
present and develop unifying concepts and strategies for considering emerging
infections and their underlying factors. The editors welcome, as contributions to the
Perspectives section, overviews, syntheses, and case studies that shed light on how
and why infections emerge, and how they may be anticipated and prevented.
Infectious diseases emerging throughout history
have included some of the most feared plagues of the
past. New infections continue to emerge today, while
many of the old plagues are with us still. These are
global problems (William Foege, former CDC direc-
tor now at the Carter Center, terms them “global
infectious disease threats”). As demonstrated by in-
fluenza epidemics, under suitable circumstances, a
new infection first appearing anywhere in the world
could traverse entire continents within days or
weeks.
We can define as “emerging” infections that have
newly appeared in the population, or have existed
but are rapidly increasing in incidence or geographic
range (1,2). Recent examples of emerging diseases
in various parts of the world include HIV/AIDS;
classic cholera in South America and Africa; cholera
due to Vibrio cholerae O139; Rift Valley fever; han-
tavirus pulmonary syndrome; Lyme disease; and
hemolytic uremic syndrome, a foodborne infection
caused by certain strains of Escherichia coli (in the
United States, serotype O157:H7).
Although these occurrences may appear inexpli-
cable, rarely if ever do emerging infections appear
without reason. Specific factors responsible for dis-
ease emergence can be identified in virtually all
cases studied (2-4). Table 1 summarizes the known
causes for a number of infections that have emerged
recently. I have suggested that infectious disease
emergence can be viewed operationally as a two-step
process: 1) Introduction of the agent into a new host
population (whether the pathogen originated in the
environment, possibly in another species, or as a
variant of an existing human infection), followed by
2) establishment and further dissemination within
the new host population (“adoption”) (4). Whatever
its origin, the infection “emerges” when it reaches a
new population. Factors that promote one or both of
these steps will, therefore, tend to precipitate dis-
ease emergence. Most emerging infections, and even
antibiotic-resistant strains of common bacterial
pathogens, usually originate in one geographic loca-
tion and then disseminate to new places (5).
Regarding the introduction step, the numerous
examples of infections originating as zoonoses (7,8)
suggest that the “zoonotic pool”—introductions of
infections from other species—is an important and
potentially rich source of emerging diseases; peri-
odic discoveries of “new” zoonoses suggest that the
zoonotic pool appears by no means exhausted. Once
introduced, an infection might then be disseminated
through other factors, although rapid course and
high mortality combined with low transmissibility
are often limiting. However, even if a zoonotic agent
is not able to spread readily from person to person
and establish itself, other factors (e.g., nosocomial
infection) might transmit the infection. Additionally,
if the reservoir host or vector becomes more widely
disseminated, the microbe can appear in new places.
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Infection or Agent Factor(s) contributing to emergence
  Viral
Argentine, Bolivian hemorrhagic
fever
Changes in agriculture favoring rodent host
Bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (cattle)
Changes in rendering processes
Dengue, dengue hemorrhagic fever Transportation, travel, and migration; urbanization
Ebola, Marburg Unknown (in Europe and the United States, importation of monkeys)
Hantaviruses Ecological or environmental changes increasing contact with rodent hosts
Hepatitis B, C Transfusions, organ transplants, contaminated hypodermic apparatus,
sexual transmission, vertical spread from infected mother to child
HIV Migration to cities and travel; after introduction, sexual transmission,
vertical spread from infected mother to child, contaminated hypodermic
apparatus (including during intravenous drug use), transfusions, organ
transplants
HTLV Contaminated hypodermic apparatus, other
Influenza (pandemic) Possibly pig-duck agriculture, facilitating reassortment of avian and
mammalian influenza viruses*
Lassa fever Urbanization favoring rodent host, increasing exposure (usually in homes)
Rift Valley fever Dam building, agriculture, irrigation; possibly change in virulence or
pathogenicity of virus
Yellow fever (in “new” areas) Conditions favoring mosquito vector
  Bacterial
Brazilian purpuric fever
(Haemophilus influenzae,
biotype aegyptius)
Probably new strain
Cholera In recent epidemic in South America, probably introduced from Asia by ship,
with spread facilitated by reduced water chlorination; a new strain (type
O139) from Asia recently disseminated by travel (similarly to past
introductions of classic cholera)
Helicobacter pylori Probably long widespread, now recognized (associated with gastric ulcers,
possibly other gastrointestinal disease)
Hemolytic uremic syndrome
(Escherichia coli O157:H7)
Mass food processing technology allowing contamination of meat
Legionella (Legionnaires’ disease) Cooling and plumbing systems (organism grows in biofilms that form on
water storage tanks and in stagnant plumbing)
Lyme borreliosis (Borrelia
burgdorferi)
Reforestation around homes and other conditions favoring tick vector and
deer (a secondary reservoir host)
Streptococcus, group A (invasive;
necrotizing)
Uncertain
Toxic shock syndrome
(Staphylococcus aureus)
Ultra-absorbency tampons
  Parasitic
Cryptosporidium, other
waterborne pathogens
Contaminated surface water, faulty water purification
Malaria (in “new” areas) Travel or migration
Schistosomiasis Dam building
*Reappearances of influenza are due to two distinct mechanisms: Annual or biennial epidemics involving new variants due to
antigenic drift (point mutations, primarily in the gene for the surface protein, hemagglutinin) and pandemic strains, arising
from antigenic shift (genetic reassortment, generally between avian and mammalian influenza strains).
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ratborne hantavirus infections are examples.
Most emerging infections appear to be caused by
pathogens already present in the environment,
brought out of obscurity or given a selective advan-
tage by changing conditions and afforded an oppor-
tunity to infect new host populations (on rare
occasions, a new variant may also evolve and cause
a new disease) (2,4). The process by which infectious
agents may transfer from animals to humans or
disseminate from isolated groups into new popula-
tions can be called “microbial traffic” (3,4). A number
of activities increase microbial traffic and as a result
promote emergence and epidemics. In some cases,
including many of the most novel infections, the
agents are zoonotic, crossing from their natural
hosts into the human population; because of the
many similarities, I include here vector-borne dis-
eases. In other cases, pathogens already present in
geographically isolated populations are given an
opportunity to disseminate further. Surprisingly
often, disease emergence is caused by human ac-
tions, however inadvertently; natural causes, such
as changes in climate, can also at times be respon-
sible (6). Although this discussion is confined largely
to human disease, similar considerations apply to
emerging pathogens in other species.
Table 2 summarizes the underlying factors re-
sponsible for emergence. Any categorization of the
factors is, of course, somewhat arbitrary but should
be representative of the underlying processes that
cause emergence. I have essentially adopted the
categories developed in the Institute of Medicine
report on emerging infections (12), with additional
definitions from the CDC emerging infections plan
(13). Responsible factors include ecological changes,
such as those due to agricultural or economic devel-
opment or to anomalies in climate; human demo-
graphic changes and behavior; travel and commerce;
technology and industry; microbial adaptation and
change; and breakdown of public health measures.
Each of these will be considered in turn.
Ecological interactions can be complex, with sev-
eral factors often working together or in sequence.
For example, population movement from rural areas
to cities can spread a once-localized infection. The
strain on infrastructure in the overcrowded and
rapidly growing cities may disrupt or slow public
health measures, perhaps allowing establishment of
the newly introduced infection. Finally, the city may
also provide a gateway for further dissemination of
the infection. Most successful emerging infections,
including HIV, cholera, and dengue, have followed
this route.
Consider HIV as an example. Although the pre-
cise ancestry of HIV-1 is still uncertain, it appears
to have had a zoonotic origin (9,10). Ecological fac-
tors that would have allowed human exposure to a
natural host carrying the virus that was the precur-
sor to HIV-1 were, therefore, instrumental in the
introduction of the virus into humans. This probably
occurred in a rural area. A plausible scenario is
suggested by the identification of an HIV-2-infected
man in a rural area of Liberia whose virus strain
resembled viruses isolated from the sooty mangabey
monkey (an animal widely hunted for food in rural
areas and the putative source of HIV-2) more closely
than it did strains circulating in the city (11). Such
findings suggest that zoonotic introductions of this
sort may occur on occasion in isolated populations
but may well go unnoticed so long as the recipients
remain isolated.  But with increasing movement
from rural areas to cities, such isolation is increas-
ingly rare. After its likely first move from a rural
area into a city, HIV-1 spread regionally along high-
ways, then by long distance routes, including air
travel, to more distant places. This last step was
critical for HIV and facilitated today’s global pan-
demic. Social changes that allowed the virus to reach
a larger population and to be transmitted despite its
relatively low natural transmissibility were instru-
mental in the success of the virus in its newfound
human host. For HIV, the long duration of infectivity
allowed this normally poorly transmissible virus
many opportunities to be transmitted and to take
advantage of such factors as human behavior (sex-
ual transmission, intravenous drug use) and chang-
ing technology (early spread through blood
transfusions and blood products) (Table 1).
Ecological Changes and Agricultural
Development
Ecological changes, including those due to agri-
cultural or economic development, are among the
most frequently identified factors in emergence.
They are especially frequent as factors in outbreaks
of previously unrecognized diseases with high case-
fatality rates, which often turn out to be zoonotic
introductions. Ecological factors usually precipitate
emergence by placing people in contact with a natu-
ral reservoir or host for an infection hitherto unfa-
miliar but usually already present (often a zoonotic
or arthropod-borne infection), either by increasing
proximity or, often, also by changing conditions so
as to favor an increased population of the microbe or
its natural host (2,4). The emergence of Lyme dis-
ease in the United States and Europe was probably
due largely to reforestation (14), which increased the
population of deer and the deer tick, the vector of
Lyme disease. The movement of people into these
areas placed a larger population in close proximity
to the vector.
Agricultural development, one of the most com-
mon ways in which people alter and interpose them-
selves into the environment, is often a factor
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orrhagic fever, causes over 100,000 cases a year in
China and has been known in Asia for centuries. The
virus is a natural infection of the field mouse Apode-
mus agrarius. The rodent flourishes in rice fields;
people usually contract the disease during the rice
harvest from contact with infected rodents. Junin
virus, the cause of Argentine hemorrhagic fever, is
an unrelated virus with a history remarkably simi-
lar to that of Hantaan virus. Conversion of grass-
land to maize cultivation favored a rodent that was
the natural host for this virus, and human cases
increased in proportion with expansion of maize
agriculture (15). Other examples, in addition to
those already known (2,15), are likely to appear as
new areas are placed under cultivation.
Perhaps most surprisingly, pandemic influenza
appears to have an agricultural origin, integrated
pig-duck farming in China. Strains causing the fre-
quent annual or biennial epidemics generally result
from mutation (“antigenic drift”), but pandemic in-
fluenza viruses do not generally arise by this proc-
ess. Instead, gene segments from two influenza
strains reassort to produce a new virus that can
infect humans (16). Evidence amassed by Webster,
Scholtissek, and others, indicates that waterfowl,
such as ducks, are major reservoirs of influenza and
that pigs can serve as “mixing vessels” for new
mammalian influenza strains (16). Pandemic influ-
enza viruses have generally come from China.
Scholtissek and Naylor suggested that integrated
pig-duck agriculture, an extremely efficient food
Table 2. Factors in infectious disease emergence*
Factor Examples of specific factors Examples of diseases
Ecological changes (including
those due to economic
development and  land use)
Agriculture; dams, changes in
water ecosystems;
deforestation/reforestation;
flood/drought; famine; climate
changes
Schistosomiasis (dams); Rift Valley fever
(dams, irrigation); Argentine hemorrhagic
fever (agriculture); Hantaan (Korean
hemorrhagic fever) (agriculture);
hantavirus pulmonary syndrome,
southwestern US, 1993 (weather
anomalies)
Human demographics,
behavior
Societal events: Population
growth and migration
(movement from rural areas
to cities); war or civil conflict;
urban decay; sexual behavior;
intravenous drug use; use of
high-density facilities
Introduction of HIV; spread of dengue; spread
of HIV and other sexually transmitted
diseases
International travel and
commerce
Worldwide movement of goods
and people; air travel
“Airport” malaria; dissemination of mosquito
vectors; ratborne hantaviruses;
introduction of cholera into South America;
dissemination of O139 V. cholerae
Technology and industry Globalization of food supplies;
changes in food processing
and packaging; organ or
tissue transplantation; drugs
causing immunosuppression;
widespread use of antibiotics
Hemolytic uremic syndrome (E. coli
contamination of hamburger meat), bovine
spongiform encephalopathy;
transfusion-associated hepatitis (hepatitis
B, C), opportunistic infections in
immunosuppressed patients,
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease from
contaminated batches of human growth
hormone (medical technology)
Microbial adaptation and
change
Microbial evolution, response to
selection in environment
Antibiotic-resistant bacteria, “antigenic drift”
in influenza virus
Breakdown in public health
measures
Curtailment or reduction in
prevention programs;
inadequate sanitation and
vector control measures
Resurgence of tuberculosis in the United
States; cholera in refugee camps in Africa;
resurgence of diphtheria in the former
Soviet Union
*Categories of factors (column 1) adapted from ref. 12, examples of specific factors (column 2) adapted from ref. 13. Categories
are not mutually exclusive; several factors may contribute to emergence of a disease (see Table 1 for additional information).
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parts of China for several centuries, puts these two
species in contact and provides a natural laboratory
for making new influenza recombinants (17). Web-
ster has suggested that, with high-intensity agricul-
ture and movement of livestock across borders,
suitable conditions may now also be found in Europe
(16).
Water is also frequently associated with disease
emergence. Infections transmitted by mosquitoes or
other arthropods, which include some of the most
serious and widespread diseases (18,19), are often
stimulated by expansion of standing water, simply
because many of the mosquito vectors breed in
water. There are many cases of diseases transmitted
by water-breeding vectors, most involving dams,
water for irrigation, or stored drinking water in
cities. (See “Changes in Human Demographics and
Behavior” for a discussion of dengue.) The incidence
of Japanese encephalitis, another mosquito-borne
disease that accounts for almost 30,000 human
cases and approximately 7,000 deaths annually in
Asia, is closely associated with flooding of fields for
rice growing. Outbreaks of Rift Valley fever in some
parts of Africa have been associated with dam build-
ing as well as with periods of heavy rainfall (19). In
the outbreaks of Rift Valley fever in Mauritania in
1987, the human cases occurred in villages near
dams on the Senegal River. The same effect has been
documented with other infections that have aquatic
hosts, such as schistosomiasis.
Because humans are important agents of ecologi-
cal and environmental change, many of these factors
are anthropogenic. Of course, this is not always the
case, and natural environmental changes, such as
climate or weather anomalies, can have the same
effect. The outbreak of hantavirus pulmonary syn-
drome in the southwestern United States in 1993 is
an example. It is likely that the virus has long been
present in mouse populations but an unusually mild
and wet winter and spring in that area led to an
increased rodent population in the spring and sum-
mer and thus to greater opportunities for people to
come in contact with infected rodents (and, hence,
with the virus); it has been suggested that the
weather anomaly was due to large-scale climatic
effects (20). The same causes may have been respon-
sible for outbreaks of hantaviral disease in Europe
at approximately the same time (21,22). With chol-
era, it has been suggested that certain organisms in
marine environments are natural reservoirs for
cholera vibrios, and that large scale effects on ocean
currents may cause local increases in the reservoir
organism with consequent flare-ups of cholera (23).
Changes in Human Demographics and
Behavior
Human population movements or upheavals,
caused by migration or war, are often important
factors in disease emergence. In many parts of the
world, economic conditions are encouraging the
mass movement of workers from rural areas to cit-
ies. The United Nations has estimated that, largely
as a result of continuing migration, by the year 2025,
65% of the world population (also expected to be
larger in absolute numbers), including 61% of the
population in developing regions, will live in cities
(24). As discussed above for HIV, rural urbanization
allows infections arising in isolated rural areas,
which may once have remained obscure and local-
ized, to reach larger populations. Once in a city, the
newly introduced infection would have the opportu-
nity to spread locally among  the population and
could also spread further along highways and inter-
urban transport routes and by airplane. HIV has
been, and in Asia is becoming, the best known bene-
ficiary of this dynamic, but many other diseases,
such as dengue, stand to benefit. The frequency of
the most severe form, dengue hemorrhagic fever,
which is thought to occur when a person is sequen-
tially infected by two types of dengue virus, is in-
creasing as different dengue viruses have extended
their range and now overlap (25). Dengue hemor-
rhagic fever is now common in some cities in Asia,
where the high prevalence of infection is attributed
to the proliferation of open containers needed for
water storage (which also provide breeding grounds
for the mosquito vector) as the population size ex-
ceeds the infrastructure (19). In urban environ-
ments, rain-filled tires or plastic bottles are often
breeding grounds of choice for mosquito vectors. The
resulting mosquito population boom is comple-
mented by the high human population density in
such situations, increasing the chances of stable
transmission cycles between infected and suscepti-
ble persons. Even in industrialized countries, e.g.,
the United States, infections such as tuberculosis
can spread through high-population density set-
tings (e.g., day care centers or prisons) (12,26-28).
Human behavior can have important effects on
disease dissemination. The best known examples
are sexually transmitted diseases, and the ways in
which such human behavior as sex or intravenous
drug use have contributed to the emergence of HIV
are now well known. Other factors responsible for
disease emergence are influenced by a variety of
human actions, so human behavior in the broader
sense is also very important. Motivating appropri-
ate individual behavior and constructive action,
both locally and in a larger scale, will be essential
for controlling emerging infections. Ironically, as
AIDS prevention efforts have demonstrated, human
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scientific knowledge.
International Travel and Commerce
The dissemination of HIV through travel has
already been mentioned. In the past, an infection
introduced into people in a geographically isolated
area might, on occasion, be brought to a new place
through travel, commerce, or war (8). Trade between
Asia and Europe, perhaps beginning with the silk
route and continuing with the Crusades, brought
the rat and one of its infections, the bubonic plague,
to Europe. Beginning in the 16th and 17th centuries,
ships bringing slaves from West Africa to the New
World also brought yellow fever and its mosquito
vector, Aedes aegypti, to the new territories. Simi-
larly, smallpox escaped its Old World origins to
wreak new havoc in the New World. In the 19th
century, cholera had similar opportunities to spread
from its probable origin in the Ganges plain to the
Middle East and, from there, to Europe and much of
the remaining world. Each of these infections had
once been localized and took advantage of opportu-
nities to be carried to previously unfamiliar parts of
the world.
Similar histories are being repeated today, but
opportunities in recent years have become far richer
and more numerous, reflecting the increasing vol-
ume, scope, and speed of traffic in an increasingly
mobile world. Rats have carried hantaviruses virtu-
ally worldwide (29). Aedes albopictus (the Asian
tiger mosquito) was introduced into the United
States, Brazil, and parts of Africa in shipments of
used tires from Asia (30). Since its introduction in
1982, this mosquito has established itself in at least
18 states of the United States and has acquired local
viruses including Eastern equine encephalomyelitis
(31), a cause of serious disease. Another mosquito-
borne disease, malaria, is one of the most frequently
imported diseases in non-endemic-disease areas,
and cases of “airport malaria” are occasionally iden-
tified.
A classic bacterial disease, cholera, recently en-
tered both South America (for the first time this
century) and Africa. Molecular typing shows the
South American isolates to be of the current pan-
demic strain (32), supporting the suggestion that the
organism was introduced in contaminated bilge
water from an Asian freighter (33). Other evidence
indicates that cholera was only one of many organ-
isms to travel in ballast water; dozens, perhaps
hundreds, of species have been exchanged between
distant places through this means of transport
alone. New bacterial strains, such as the recently
identified Vibrio cholerae O139, or an epidemic
strain of Neisseria meningitidis (34,35) (also exam-
ples of microbial adaptation and change) have dis-
seminated rapidly along routes of trade and travel,
as have antibiotic-resistant bacteria (5,36).
Technology and Industry
High-volume rapid movement characterizes not
only travel, but also other industries in modern
society. In operations, including food production,
that process or use products of biological origin,
modern production methods yield increased effi-
ciency and reduced costs but can increase the
chances of accidental contamination and amplify the
effects of such contamination. The problem is fur-
ther compounded by globalization, allowing the op-
portunity to introduce agents from far away. A
pathogen present in some of the raw material may
find its way into a large batch of final product, as
happened with the contamination of hamburger
meat by E. coli strains causing hemolytic uremic
syndrome (37). In the United States the implicated
E. coli strains are serotype O157:H7; additional
serotypes have been identified in other countries.
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), which
emerged in Britain within the last few years, was
likely an interspecies transfer of scrapie from sheep
to cattle (38) that occurred when changes in render-
ing processes led to incomplete inactivation of scra-
pie agent in sheep byproducts fed to cattle (39).
The concentrating effects that occur with blood
and tissue products have inadvertently dissemi-
nated infections unrecognized at the time, such as
HIV and hepatitis B and C. Medical settings are also
at the front line of exposure to new diseases, and a
number of infections, including many emerging in-
fections, have spread nosocomially in health care
settings (Table 2). Among the numerous examples,
in the outbreaks of Ebola fever in Africa many of the
secondary cases were hospital acquired, most trans-
mitted to other patients through contaminated hy-
podermic apparatus, and some to the health care
staff by contact. Transmission of Lassa fever to
health care workers has also been documented.
On the positive side, advances in diagnostic tech-
nology can also lead to new recognition of agents
that are already widespread. When such agents are
newly recognized, they may at first often be labeled,
in some cases incorrectly, as emerging infections.
Human herpesvirus 6 (HHV-6) was identified only a
few years ago, but the virus appears to be extremely
widespread (40) and has recently been implicated as
the cause of roseola (exanthem subitum), a very
common childhood disease (41). Because roseola has
been known since at least 1910, HHV-6 is likely to
have been common for decades and probably much
longer. Another recent example is the bacterium
Helicobacter pylori, a probable cause of gastric ul-
cers (42) and some cancers (43,44). We have lived
with these diseases for a long time without knowing
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tageous, offering new promise of controlling a pre-
viously intractable disease, such as treating gastric
ulcers with specific antimicrobial therapy.
Microbial Adaptation and Change
Microbes, like all other living things, are con-
stantly evolving. The emergence of antibiotic-resis-
tant bacteria as a result of the ubiquity of
antimicrobials in the environment is an evolution-
ary lesson on microbial adaptation, as well as a
demonstration of the power of natural selection.
Selection for antibiotic-resistant bacteria (5,36) and
drug-resistant parasites has become frequent,
driven by the wide and sometimes inappropriate use
of antimicrobial drugs in a variety of applications
(27,45,46). Pathogens can also acquire new antibi-
otic resistance genes from other, often nonpatho-
genic, species in the environment (36), selected or
perhaps even driven by the selection pressure of
antibiotics.
Many viruses show a high mutation rate and can
rapidly evolve to yield new variants (47). A classic
example is influenza (48). Regular annual epidemics
are caused by “antigenic drift” in a previously circu-
lating influenza strain. A change in an antigenic site
of a surface protein, usually the hemagglutinin (H)
protein, allows the new  variant to reinfect pre-
viously infected persons because the altered antigen
is not immediately recognized by the immune
system.
On rare occasions, perhaps more often with non-
viral pathogens than with viruses (49), the evolution
of a new variant may result in a new expression of
disease. The epidemic of Brazilian purpuric fever in
1990, associated with a newly emerged clonal vari-
ant of Hemophilus influenzae, biogroup aegyptius,
may fall into this category. It is possible, but not yet
clear, that some recently described manifestations
of disease by group A Streptococcus, such as rapidly
invasive infection or necrotizing fasciitis, may also
fall into this category.
Breakdown of Public Health Measures
and Deficiencies in Public Health
Infrastructure
Classical public health and sanitation measures
have long served to minimize dissemination and
human exposure to many pathogens spread by tra-
ditional routes such as water or preventable by
immunization or vector control. The pathogens
themselves often still remain, albeit in reduced
numbers, in reservoir hosts or in the environment,
or in small pockets of infection and, therefore, are
often able to take advantage of the opportunity to
reemerge if there are breakdowns in preventive
measures.
Reemerging diseases are those, like cholera, that
were once decreasing but are now rapidly increasing
again. These are often conventionally understood
and well recognized public health threats for which
(in most cases) previously active public health meas-
ures had been allowed to lapse, a situation that
unfortunately now applies all too often in both de-
veloping countries and the inner cities of the indus-
trialized world. The appearance of reemerging
diseases may, therefore, often be a sign of the break-
down of public health measures and should be a
warning against complacency in the war against
infectious diseases.
Cholera, for example, has recently been raging in
South America (for the first time in this century) (50)
and Africa. The rapid spread of cholera in South
America may have been abetted by recent reduc-
tions in chlorine levels used to treat water supplies
(34). The success of cholera and other enteric dis-
eases is often due to the lack of a reliable water
supply. These problems are more severe in develop-
ing countries, but are not confined to these areas.
The U.S. outbreak of waterborne Cryptosporidium
infection in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in the spring of
1993, with over 400,000 estimated cases, was in part
due to a nonfunctioning water filtration plant (51);
similar deficiencies in water purification have been
found in other cities in the United States (52).
For our Future
In his accompanying article, Dr. David Satcher
discusses the history of infectious diseases and the
many infections that, from the dawn of history to the
present, have traveled with the caravans and fol-
lowed the invading armies. The history of infectious
diseases has been a history of microbes on the
march, often in our wake, and of microbes that have
taken advantage of the rich opportunities offered
them to thrive, prosper, and spread. And yet the
historical processes that have given rise to the emer-
gence of “new” infections throughout history con-
tinue today with unabated force; in fact, they are
accelerating, because the conditions of modern life
ensure that the factors responsible for disease emer-
gence are more prevalent than ever before. Speed of
travel and global reach are further borne out by
studies modeling the spread of influenza epidemics
(53) and HIV (54,55).
Humans are not powerless, however, against this
relentless march of microbes. Knowledge of the fac-
tors underlying disease emergence can help focus
resources on the key situations and areas worldwide
(3,4) and develop more effective prevention strate-
gies. If we are to protect ourselves against emerging
diseases, the essential first step is effective global
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ing infections (3,12,13,56). This must be tied to in-
centives, such as national development, and
eventually be backed by a system for an appropriate
rapid response. World surveillance capabilities are
critically deficient (12,56,57). Efforts, such as the
CDC plan (13), now under way in the United States
and internationally to remedy this situation are the
essential first steps and deserve strong support.
Research, both basic and applied, will also be vital.
This Journal and the “Perspectives”
Section
Early warning of emerging and reemerging infec-
tions depends on the ability to identify the unusual
as early as possible. Information is, therefore, essen-
tial. Hence this journal, which is intended as a
peer-reviewed forum for the discussion of concepts
and examples relevant to emerging infectious dis-
eases and their causes, and to provide a channel for
field reports and observations on emerging infec-
tions. The “Perspectives” section will provide gen-
eral overviews dealing with factors in disease
emergence, conceptual syntheses of information, ap-
proaches for studying or predicting emerging infec-
tions, and analyses that shed light on how and why
infections emerge, and how they may be anticipated
and prevented. Submissions for this section are
warmly invited. In coming issues, Perspectives will
deal in greater detail with many of the factors dis-
cussed in this overview article, and with ways to
dissect steps in the emergence process. Discussion
of technologies that are broadly applicable to the
identification or control of emerging diseases are
also appropriate for this section. Case studies are
welcome if they are used to develop broader lessons.
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